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"The examples in history, wherein subjugation and tyranny have been introduced from abroad, under the mask of friendship and defence, are infinite: and, the domestic examples of freedom destroyed by surrendering the sword to the sovereign, in hopes of being thereby defended, are precisely as many in number as the instances of that insane policy." MAJOR CARTWRIGHT. *Ægis*, Vol. I. page 36.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—Major Cartwright, from whose work upon national defence my motto is taken, has for a long time most earnestly endeavoured to produce, in the public mind, a conviction, that there can be no sure and safe defence but that which arises from a general arming of the people. His work is very elaborate, and, therefore, I shall not attempt to dip into the detail; but these are the positions it maintains: that the whole of the people, capable of bearing arms, ought to have arms put into their hands, and ought, at all times, to be fit to use those arms; that there might be a standing army for foreign service, but that the defence of the country should rest solely upon the people; that a country defended by a standing army is, in fact, a country enslaved with means furnished by itself.—Amongst those who are not desirous of keeping the people in a state of virtual slavery, the scheme of Major Cartwright has been objected to only because they doubted of its practicability; only because they feared, that, as opposed to standing armies, to regular and well-disciplined troops, under experienced commanders, an armed population would be as chaff before the wind; and such, I confess, was my opinion, though I always approved of putting arms into the hands of the people; because, after all is said and done, the country is *the people's*, and, if they cannot be trusted with its defence, for *whose sake*, I would ask, is that defence to be undertaken?—But, the events in Spain do really seem to promise a complete practical proof of the soundness of the doctrine of this venerable patriot, who, I should think, must be thereby not a little gratified.—Our eyes are now directed, in the most forcible manner, towards a people, who had been so long oppressed, that they had apparently lost the very notion of freedom; a people amongst whom there existed scarcely the forms of rights and immunities; a people who possessed not any ground-work for a general arming; a people completely disarmed, and cut off from all association with one another for

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any national purpose; a people sunk even in their own eyes, and appearing to retain, under their late government, not the desire to be free, and, of course, not the smallest desire to defend their country against an invader. In this state of abject subjection, they quietly see their government introduce a foreign army into their country and even into its metropolis; the commander of that army is, by the act of their own king, constituted the Lieutenant of the kingdom, and they are commanded to obey him upon pain of death; all the passes and out-posts of their country are, beforehand, placed in the hands of the invader; all those, at whose names they have long been accustomed to tremble, go over to that invader, espouse his cause and endorse his proclamations; the people have no sovereign, no constituted authority, no acknowledged chief, no leader, no known point round which to rally, while they are hourly plied with threats of punishment, of towns sacked and inhabitants exterminated, and that, too, by those who have given to the world numerous proofs, that, in this respect, they never fail of being as good as their word. Were there ever disadvantages so great? And, if this people (which God grant!) should succeed in defending their country against those very armies who have walked over the fortresses of Germany, Italy, and Flanders, and who have hoisted their flag at Vienna, Berlin, and almost at Petersburg; if this should be the case, who will say, that martello-towers, intrenchments, lines of circumvallation, depôts, barracks, and standing armies are necessary for the internal defence of a country?—It has, of late, been said, in answer to those who have expressed their dislike of the new system of an immense standing army and numerous military depôts and stations, that "the circumstances of Europe are totally changed." In other words, that, because the French have great standing armies to attack us with, it is necessary for us to have standing armies for our defence; but, this argument will, if the Spanish Patriots succeed, be no longer

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of any force; if they beat the very armies who have beaten all the standing armies and all the most experienced generals in Europe, the question will be settled at once, and there will not, I should think, be a single man in England bold enough to insist, that we stand in need of so fearful a military force in this kingdom, especially if the arming plan of Major Cartwright were adopted, and all the frippery of volunteering were thrown aside.—The stand, which the Spanish Patriots have *already* made, does, indeed, warrant the conclusion here aimed at; for, we are in a situation quite different from theirs. * We have no invading army in the heart of the country; we have no treacherous ministers gone over to the enemy; we have no want of arms and ammunition; we have no want of a settled system of government; every man is in his place; and, above all, there are here no passes open for the inroads of an invader. Should the Spanish Patriots fail, therefore, after having made a respectable stand, their want of final success will be no proof of our inability to defend ourselves, under such a system as should, at once, put arms in the people's hands and inspire their minds with motives to use them. In this light, considered as affording lessons to ourselves, the deeds of the Patriots in Spain are deeply interesting to every man in this kingdom. And, if it should become the general opinion, that our defence needs not barracks, depots, fortresses, and standing armies, and that opinion should prevail, what a blessing it will be! That army now costs about twenty millions of pounds sterling a year, raised in taxes upon the people. It employs, in all ways, about three hundred thousand able men. Not more than from 40 to 50 thousand would be necessary for services abroad. What a great relief it would be, if the rest of this vast number of men were to return to labour, and if, at the same time, fifteen millions of pounds sterling a year were saved! Why, the very *boards* and *commissions*, appointed to examine into the accounts of our present army, cost the whole amount of no trifling tax. The ramifications of army connection and influence are endless. We do not all wear red coats, but who is there that can say, that he is quite independent of the standing army? If any one will say, that it is good that it should be so; that military rule is the best sort of rule; and that all which has been written and said to the contrary is nonsense; such a man is candid, and may be disputed with, but, with the hypocrites, who keep crying out "constitution," and yet do not wish that means of defence may be found other than those of

barracks, depots, and a standing army, there is no reasoning at all. — It argues well that the Spanish Patriots have taken possession of the French fleet themselves. They thereby discover confidence as to their final success; and, though their commander at Cadiz avowedly acts for Ferdinand, that may produce but little mischief. Indeed, if the Spaniards restore Ferdinand, their work will not be less a *revolution*; for, they thereby cast off their old king, and, a new-modeling of their government will necessarily be included. Indeed, it is possible, that they might, in one sense, have a better bargain of Ferdinand than of an entire new sovereign; for he would be more dependant upon his people, than a chief of another description might be; for, a new chief might threaten them with a restoration of the old despotism, and thus, with the aid of the name of pretender, terrify them into submission to a sway even more tyrannical in fact, though not in form, than that from which they had delivered themselves. They will and ought to, do as they please as to this matter; but, I am glad to see, that whatever formal acts are done, are done in the name of *the people*. It is the "deputy of the people," who goes to treat with the French admiral; and, in the people's name the several juntas, or councils, all act. A war for Ferdinand, avowedly for him and in his name, would assuredly fail.—Some of the leaders seem very anxious to prevent the people from supposing, that they are engaged in a *revolution*; and, it is not only possible, but probable, that they may not have a design to make a revolution; but, they must, or they must submit to Napoleon; for, the energy, the talents, the free discussions, the publications, without which his power is not to be resisted, will and must produce a complete change of the government. The men, who shall have beaten the armies of France, who shall have driven out the hordes of resolute robbers, armed with muskets, will never again submit to the insolent sway of a swarm of tame cheaters, who pillaged under the sanction of what they called *the law*, who, having the jail and the gibbet under their command, with endless bands of *alguazils* and *corregidores* to assist them, not only plundered the people, but made them assist in the act of plundering one another. No: there is but this one choice. Either the people of Spain must be slaves to Napoleon, or they must be free; and, indeed, this is the only choice that they ought to have; if they are not fighting for freedom, what are they fighting for? If they are content with being slaves, what matters it who is their master? Joseph

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Napoleon may be scoundrel enough; but, what could he possibly do worse, than sell thirty or forty thousand of the people to go to fight in the north of Europe, as the late detestable government did? How could he disgrace the Spaniards more than they were before disgraced? The junta of Seville, which seems to have taken the lead of all the rest, say that "it became necessary to break the shackles, which prevented the Spanish people from displaying their generous ardour;" but, if the junta believes, that these shackles are to be made whole again, they grossly deceive themselves. The battle is for the freedom of Spain; for the effecting of a revolution; and, we shall see, that, let who will be sovereign, the government will bear little resemblance to what it was before. Were the Buonapartés to be defeated at once, the old bribery and corruption system might be patched up, with some little talk about "a reform of abuses" and a hundred or two of fair promises, made but to be broken; but as the struggle will be long and bloody, if the Patriots succeed, those who have bled in the cause, will take care not to become again the slaves of those who before betrayed them, and of whose baseness they will, at every new danger and difficulty, contract a new degree of hatred. — It is curious enough, that, after all the continent of Europe has submitted to the arms of France, stout resistance on the part of the people, should, at last, be met with in the Spaniards. Doctor Duigenan and his friends must be surprized to find that the "*most catholic*" appear to be the *only* people, who have a sincere hatred of the French and their emperor. They will hardly place their motto, "no-popery," upon the English banners to be unfurled in Spain. Napoleon has endeavoured to persuade the Spaniards, that he has the Pope's sanction for what he has done, and is doing, with regard to Spain; but, as will be seen by the documents, the Spanish Patriots reject this with scorn, and remind the people, that he has just come from robbing the poor Pope. Why should we suppose, then, that the Catholics of England or Ireland would be disposed to side with Napoleon? Why are they less worthy of trust, in our fleets and armies, than Protestants are? — If the Catholic religion, the religion of our forefathers, be so damnable thing, why do we assist Catholics in a foreign country? This is a weighty point for tender conscience, and well worthy of an early investigation; for, though Buonaparté our enemy at present, it seems that he is doing his best to root out popery, and is, in

this respect, co-operating with the ministry of England. Napoleon has had to fight against Protestants enough, upon the continent of Europe, and has beaten them all, making their princes scamper before him like sheep. He has found the most Catholic princes still more gentle, if possible; but, the people, he has found resolute to defend their country. This proves, that the mere circumstance of being a Catholic does not make men prone to either slavery or cowardice. The greatest coward, the most notorious coward, the most beaten and despised thing, in the shape of a man, that I ever heard or read of, was a Protestant. There may be a coward as perfect amongst the Catholics; but, for the honour of human nature, I should hope that there never was but one of the sort in the whole world. It is not a man's religion that makes him a coward. It is a certain natural weakness, which no man can help, and for which he is not to be blamed, unless he voluntarily assume the garb of a hero, and put forward pretensions to powers and honours and rewards, in that character. When he does this, he deserves not only public censure but punishment; because he, by his cowardice, exposes the lives and reputation of the soldiers or sailors under his command, tarnishes the renown and hazards the safety of his country, and this is what no man ought to be suffered to do with impunity. — It would be rash to say precisely what our ministers ought to do in the way of assistance given to Spain; but, I must confess, that I should like to have heard, before now, of the expedition having *actually sailed*. What does it do hanging about so long? If it does not land in Spain, there are other places enough. I think it will be lucky if the struggle in Spain be of long duration; but, it depends, perhaps, upon our promptitude at the present moment, whether there shall be any serious struggle at all. The disposition of the Spanish revolutionists has been known long enough for us to have received an account of the reception of our promises of aid; and yet our armaments are still lying in port! It is rumoured, that there have been difficulties about choosing a *commander*; but, surely, this cannot be the case, seeing how great an abundance of generals we have. I hope the commander, whenever he is appointed, will be one that has, at some time or other, in some one instance, *faced* the enemy, *faced* the French, I mean, in the *field*; for, as to facing them over a bottle, that any coward can do. Let our troops have, at their head, a man who has one single time in his life looked the French in the

face, in the field of battle, and I shall be confident as to the result. There should, however, be no delay in sending what troops we can muster up to make a diversion in favour of the Spaniards. Napoleon has now a pretty wide range to look to, and will not be able to provide for every contingency and to carry on a war in Spain at the same time. So large a country as Spain, including Portugal, in a state of pretty general resistance, will demand, at least, two hundred thousand men. Then there is all the space between the Atlantic and the Adriatic to keep in subjection, together with Holland and Germany. He never can do it all. If there be a general insurrection in Spain, followed by a war of six months, he must be defeated there, or must lose his sway in some other quarter. Of what vast importance is it, then, that we are prompt in contributing our share towards the producing of that insurrection, towards blowing up a flame, which when once safely kindled cannot fail to burn with fury. Our armament, under some brave and experienced officer, should now have been landed, or, at least, hovering upon some coast, where it might have drawn off part of the force of Napoleon. But, really, the language of the Patriots is so bold, it contains such home truths, it gives such hard slaps, that I have been half afraid of their *discretion* being suspected. "The cry of *death, or freedom*, resounds from one end of the kingdom to the other; the dishonourable career of CORRUPTION has been run; the arts and machinations to *divide* and *terrify* been attempted in vain." Such is their language in one of their proclamations, and there are others, which are still more "violent" upon the subject of *corruption* and *abuses*. So that, in fact, if one were to give any description of the cause, in which the Patriots are engaged, one would be disposed to say that they are waging a war against bribery and corruption and speculation much more than against Buonaparté, and, you know, reader, it is Buonaparté whom we wish to put down.—The talk about *subscriptions* has been mere talk. No subscription is going on; no subscription is encouraged by any one in authority; we hear of no voluntary contributions proposed. Very cool upon it, at both ends of the town! It is to be hoped, that the Spaniards will be able to do without such subscriptions. Meetings upon the subject might produce statements and comparisons and conclusions; but, surely, there could be no danger in Englishmen meeting to congratulate one another upon the prospect of seeing Spain

recover her freedom! Yet, the ministerial newspapers do actually discourage all such meetings. They seem to be extremely anxious to keep people from having an opportunity to make speeches upon the subject; and, I should not be very much surprised to hear any meeting which may take place, termed disorderly, if not seditious. Only let the thing go well on in Spain, however, and, in time, we shall not, I hope, have to regret the want of such meetings.

THE POOR.—I was, some little time past, put in possession of a statement, relative to the expenditure, on account of the poor, in the parish of ENFIELD, in Middlesex, which statement I deem worthy of general notice, and which, therefore, I shall insert here.—"ENFIELD, April, 1808.—The following Comparison of Parochial Expenditure, between the time when we were in the Road to Ruin, and the present Year, is drawn for the information of the inhabitants of this parish; by PETER HARDY.—By introducing a regular and known Table at the workhouse (by which the people are better fed than before); by substituting economy for waste; by obliging those to work who were able; and by refusing the able and healthy, but idle, drunken and dissolute, admittance into the workhouse, (which ought only to be a refuge for infancy, the sick and the aged) society in general has been benefited, and the inhabitants of this town relieved of a very enormous burthen.—At that time as much Meat was destroyed at the workhouse in one week, as is consumed now in three months. That article cost us then at the rate of £600 per annum. It now costs us £60.—At that time we consumed of bread 90 half-pecks per week. We now consume on an average 16.—Bread and flour alone cost us in a year then, double what the whole house costs now.—We paid then, for cheese only, double what we pay now for every article of shop goods.—We then consumed 100 cart-loads of wood and 18 chaldron of coals in a year. We now consume only 12 chaldron of coals, without any wood.—At that time we raised £3,900 poor's rates per annum. We now raise £1,900.—We then had above £2,000 by sale of timber from the Chace, in addition to our rates. We now have £400.—We were at that time very deeply in debt. We now do not owe any debts."—This reform was, it appears, effected by the activity, good-sense, and public-spirit of this Mr.

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Hardy, to whom the parish have given, I believe, some mark of their respect and gratitude.—Of all the numerous symptoms of national decline in England, none is, perhaps, so strong, so completely indisputable, as the rapid increase of our paupers. There are, out of nine millions of people, one million and a quarter of paupers; that is to say, of persons, who *cannot* have any motive whatever for wishing to preserve the government and the laws. Nearly a *seventh* part of the whole population of England and Wales is of this description. As to the great cause of this increase of pauperism, it evidently is the corresponding increase of taxation, through the means of which so many are maintained in idleness upon the fruit of the labour of others. I have, I think, upon a former occasion, clearly shown, that taxes, if carried to a certain extent, *must* cause some of the people to be so poor as to be unable to maintain themselves; but, at present, my object is to offer a few observations as to what might now be done, with a view of checking this lamentable evil, if only one or two of the principal persons, in each parish, would heartily set about the work.—Until of late years, there was, amongst the poor, a horror of becoming chargeable to the parish. To become chargeable was a reproach; and never to have been chargeable was a subject of proud exultation. This feeling, which was almost universal, was the parent of industry, of care, of economy, of frugality, and of *early* habits of labour amongst children. But, this feeling is now extinguished; the barrier, shame, has been broken down, and in have rushed for parish aid all those, whether young or old, who are not of a turn of mind which must always be rarely met with.—The parishes, instead of endeavouring to check the evil by a vigilant attention to the different earnings and means and manners of the poor, have, in general, adopted the easy course of giving *wages* in the shape of relief. For instance, the week's wages is, in some places, ten shillings, and, in order to put the labourer with a family upon a par with the labourer without a family, the former receives, in the shape of relief, a certain allowance for each child above two. So that, as a *matter of course*, every labourer, who has more than two children, becomes, with all his family, paupers; they sink quietly and contentedly into that state, from which their grandfathers, and even their fathers, shrunk with horror. Nay, when a labourer, in such a state of things, marries, he counts the pauper chest among his ways and means; and even

his hours of courtship are partly spent in anticipating the receipts from that never-failing source. That men should possess *spirit*, that there should be any independence of mind, that there should be frankness, amongst persons so situated, is impossible. Accordingly, whoever has had experience in such matters, must have observed, with deep regret, that instead of priding himself upon his little possessions, instead of decking out his children to the best advantage, instead of laying up in store the trifling surplus produce of the harvest month, the labourer now, in but too many instances, takes care to spend all as fast as he gets it, makes himself as poor as he can, and uses all the art that he is master of to cause it to be believed, that he is still more miserable than he really is. What an example for the children! And what must the rising generation be? It used to be the boast of the labourer, that he could mow or reap or hough so much in a day; that he could earn so much money by his labour; but, now, if he does earn great wages, his first and greatest care is to disguise the fact; and, it frequently happens, that he will change from master to master, and from one sort of work to another, for the express purpose of preventing the parish from being able to ascertain the amount of his earnings. When part of his children become able to assist in maintaining the family, he takes care that the amount of their earnings shall never be known; and, as he still gains by counting them amongst the number to be maintained, he keeps them at home, in preference to sending them to annual service, where they would, under the command of others, contract those habits of industry, regularity, and obedience, which, in very few cases, in any rank of life, children contract at home. So that this system operates in producing a twofold mischief, 1st, in encouraging the labourer to rear his children paupers, and 2ndly, in preventing them from ever shaking-off their pauper-like habits. When children, thus reared, do become servants, they are generally the very worst of servants. Bred up in dissimulation, no word that they utter can be believed; they are totally unworthy of confidence; and, as is universally the case with slaves, they are sure to be insolent when they can be so with impunity.—It is very right, that some power should stand ready to decide between the pauper and the parish; but, even this institution, so benevolent in its intention, has its evils. To resist, by a formal process, the claims of a pauper has always the appearance, or, at least, is liable to the imputation, of

hardness of heart; and, especially when the expence of yielding does not fall upon themselves, this is an imputation which few men are willing to incur; yet, it is easy to conceive, what shocking abuses must arise from a general yielding to claims of this sort. Parish aid has this peculiar defect in it, that it *never excites gratitude*, and, of course, produces none of those amiable effects, which naturally flow from gratitude. Upon the parish the pauper makes a *demand*; he comes, like a dun, with a threat of the law ready to apply in case of refusal; and, whether he obtain his ends or not, his feelings are nearly the same.

—There is another terrible consequence of this system of general pauperism, and that is, that it withholds from the cripple, from the orphan, from the helpless widow, from the aged, and from all those who are really objects of compassion, and who ought to be comfortably supported and tenderly guarded; from all these it withholds a part, at least, of what they ought to receive. It confounds these with those who have brought themselves into misery by their laziness, or their vices. I know an instance, in a parish which has now a work-house, of two men, one about forty, who lost his two eyes in two drunken brawls, and who scarcely ever did a day's work in his life; the other, upwards of fourscore, who fought at the battle of Minden, and who worked, I think, 'till his eighty-fourth year. What could be more unjust than to couple these men together under the general name of paupers, and to treat them alike? Yet, until they had a work-house, the parish, though very desirous to do it, were unable to discriminate; were unable to give any visible and solid proof, that they looked upon one man as being more entitled to their compassion than the other.—I have introduced the statement respecting the work-house at Enfield, for the purpose of showing what abuses work-houses are exposed to, when left in common hands; but, I am satisfied, that, if the *gentlemen* of the parishes, whether in town or country, were to take the superintendence, or controul, upon themselves, such establishments would become of the greatest utility. To the farmers, who are the *payers*, the task of refusal is always an ungracious one; being parties, and parties refusing to pay, the magistrates hear them, and ought to hear them, with some suspicion, unless under particular circumstances. Besides, the farmers *have not time* to attend to any concerns but their own; and, unless they are of the superior order of farmers, they can-

not be expected to be proper judges of all the various matters, upon which they have to decide. Gentlemen are seldom payers of poor-rates to an amount that can produce a temptation to do what is cruel or harsh; they are better qualified for making representations to the magistrates; they stand as umpires between the farmers and the poor, with a little harmless bias towards the latter; and, it would happen but in few cases, that there would be any appeal from their decision. An instance of the effects of an interference of this sort may be witnessed in the parish of Droxford, in this county, where one gentleman has, by his sole exertions, reduced the poor rates to one half of their former amount, and is, I am told, able to say, that now there is no such thing as misery in his parish, where it was formerly visible in numerous families. For my part, I know of no greater blessing to a parish than such a man; and, I wish he had more imitators, amongst those who run from the misery of their neighbourhoods to the gaieties of the metropolis. The parish rates, all together, of England and Wales amount to nearly, if not quite, *six millions* annually. Look at *Enfield* and *Droxford*; and ask yourself, why, under the zealous efforts of only one or two men in each parish, a *general* effect of the same sort, and in the same degree, might not take place? The poor-rates, in general, *amount to one half as much as the rent of the land*. Is this an object beneath the consideration of the proprietors of the land? Or, is it of less importance to them, than the babble about what they call politics, which so many of them help to keep up in London? But, the most weighty consideration of all, is, that, by neglecting to perform this, their natural duty, they suffer those who are real objects of compassion and of tenderness to be confounded with the lazy, sturdy pauper, and they leave the rising generation to come up to man's estate, with minds divested of even the idea of independence. If a gentleman talks to me of love of country, of public-spirit, I would ask him how he can so effectually and usefully evince it, as in this way? His efforts in almost all other ways may be useless; but, in this way, they are not only certain to be attended with utility, but immediate utility.—The numerous general regulations that have been made by parliament, without producing any good effect, the paupers having, notwithstanding all of them, continued to

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Increase in number, prove, that, while the present system of taxation lasts, it is in vain to seek for any general remedy for this great and disgraceful evil. The remedy, or the mitigation, at least, must come from individual exertion, or the whole evil must not only remain, but must receive daily addition. It appears to me, that country gentlemen should lay it down as a rule never to have a pauper in their employ; and that, according to the quantity of their work, they should select men of the largest families and pay them for their labour a sufficiency for their maintenance. This would be giving an example to the farmers, and would, at the same time, be fixing a mark of disgrace upon pauperism. I cannot endure the idea of the labourer's receiving regularly, while he and his family are all in good health, a part of his subsistence in the character of a pauper. Nothing does good but that which is *earned*. There are particular cases when acts of charity (properly so called) are useful; but, I like not the system of *presents* and *rewards*. The labourer, like other men, will do little for himself if he be coaxed to do it; and, like other men, he will not, if he can avoid it, have any one to watch over him, or pry into his concerns. I am for giving him his earnings, and, that he may set a high value upon them, say not a word which shall lead him to believe, that I do not regard them as his own. If I had a labourer, who was to become a notorious drunkard, I would dismiss him, because it would be my duty strongly to shew my disapprobation of so beastly a vice; but, after a good deal of observation, I am thoroughly convinced, that, as a "watched pot never boils," so a watched penny never breeds. The lending of cows to cottagers and all that system of superintendence, including child-bed linen and the like, though arising, in most instances, from amiable motives, has, I am persuaded, never done any good; and, I make no doubt, that, if the fact could be ascertained, fifty pounds expended in *good cheer* of the old fashion, would not only excite more gratitude but would work more solid advantage to the receivers, than ten thousand pounds expended in "*comforts*" and spell-binding-books. The "*comforting*" system necessarily implies *interference* on one side, and *dependance* on the other; and, if these exist, it matters not whether you *call* the "*comforted*" family paupers; for, they will feel themselves dependent, and will have no other than the mind and character which belong to the pauper state, the most

prominent feature of which is dissimulation, or, what is vulgarly called "making a poor mouth." I do not think that ladies visiting poor families is at all useful. When any part of a family, particularly the mother, is *ill*, then, indeed, such visits are proper; but, I have no opinion of the visitings, which, in some places, are in vogue. They savour too much of ostentation; and, whether they be really so, or not, ninety nine times out of a hundred they are so considered by the visited party. In short, I am for giving the labourer a sufficiency, in the shape of *wages*, to maintain his family, and leaving him to live and manage his affairs entirely in his own way.—The great obstacle to the restoration of the labourers to their former independence of mind, is, that their wages, generally speaking, are partly paid in the shape of parish relief. A man, with a wife and three children, cannot possibly keep body and soul together upon ten, or even twelve, shillings a week; and, how, then, is he to *labour* upon the food which that wages will supply? Well, say the employers, we will, then, give him a little more wages in the shape of relief; because, if we make an addition to what he receives in the shape of wages, we must raise the wages of single-men also. And, why not? Would you have no soul of them all earn a penny more than what is barely sufficient to sustain life? Would you have them to be, in effect, slaves from the cradle to the grave? Of what avail is it for a man to be industrious, if his industry will neither enable him to lay something up in store, nor enjoy a day of leisure or recreation? What motive has he to keep from the parish list, if he be certain, that a cut in the hand in whetting his scythe, will make him a pauper?—To those whom I may have wearied with these desultory remarks, I would beg leave to repeat, that the paupers of England and Wales are nearly a million and a quarter in number, and that, by the exertions of individuals of weight in their several parishes, this shameful evil may in some measure, at least, be removed.

Botley, 14th July, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—GALICIA.

(Continued from page 64.)

GALICIANS.—You have bewailed the fate of your amiable Ferdinand. The horror of the perfidy by which he was seduced, still burns in your bosoms. You fear danger to our holy religion, you look upon our exterior worship as annihilated, upon our altars profaned, and the temples of the eternal and sole Omnipotent converted into places of de

solation by order of the tyrant, who arrogates to himself the title of arbiter of destinies, because he has succeeded in oppressing the noble French nation, without recollecting, that he himself is mortal, and that he only holds the power delegated to him for our chastisement. You turned your eyes towards the municipal authorities, and you even insulted them; because they did not animate the flame of your indignation against the enemy. The time is come. Your kingdom has assembled in Cortes, and re-assumed the sovereign authority, which under such circumstances devolves upon it by right, and of which its first exercise is in complying with your wishes so loudly declared; you have already a leader, and the most vigorous dispositions are taking. Fly therefore to arms! and let us march to defend the cause of God, the honour of our country, our lives and our fortunes! Will you be insensible to the voice of the nation, and will you only be found valiant in the streets of your cities? Now, that twenty thousand brave soldiers have taken up your cause for theirs, will you refuse to unite with their generous battalions? Will you hesitate to embody yourselves with these masters of the military art? Do you imagine, forsooth, that your courage without discipline can be useful? Such ideas avaunt—receive in your arms these heroes who are going to marshal your strength, and only from the common name of Spaniards, even without being Galicians, feel a deep interest in your cause. The kingdom sends them to you. You should obey their sovereign and legitimate authority. Let discord fly from us; we are brothers, and are going to sacrifice ourselves for the same sacred cause.—Galicians! enrol yourselves from 16 to 40 years of age. It is better to die in defence of your religion and firesides, and in your own country, than to be led bound to slaughter in order to satisfy an inordinate ambition. The French conscription comprises you. If you do not serve your kingdom, you will go and die in the north. We lose nothing. For even should we be unsuccessful, we shall have freed ourselves by a glorious death from the galling chains of a foreign yoke. But there is no reason to fear this peril. Death has alarms only for poltroons—and God, for whose cause we are going to fight, will watch over us, because, in the end, every mortal has a determined measure, and we ought to trust in his mercy, that when his wrath (which we so much deserve) is appeased, he will protect us. The standard of your holy patron Saint James is now unfurled; let us follow it.—Galicians! The Asturians and Alouese have 80,000 men enlisted, and already

20,000 under arms. Let us go and relieve our brethren, these intrepid men. We shall thus save our country from becoming the theatre of war. This kingdom, which has assembled through your instance, expect it from you. This kingdom will reward those who distinguish themselves, with every thing in its power, and at the conclusion of the war it will immediately give you your discharge, and enable you to enjoy the fruits of victory under the shade of the laurels you will have won, and consign to your children at your ease, the example of your glorious deeds.—DOMINGO VALADO DE PARGA, *sec.* Corunna, June 5th, 1808.

BISCAY.

BRAVE BISCAYANS AND COMRADES—Your wish is already fulfilled; the mine, which lay deep in your bosom, and our's, is sprung. The time has arrived when we are all called upon to make a noble sacrifice for our holy religion, our good laws and customs; and what object is more worthy of such a sacrifice than their preservation. Since last night, the whole of this town is in arms, to avenge the provocation and insults we have received from the French. Nothing was capable to check the ardour of our people, especially since they knew that you entertained the same sentiments with them. Yes, their ardour, their fervent courage, must be regulated by order, intelligence, and prudence, that it may produce the result at which we all aspire. Above all things, it is absolutely necessary that we should act in concert, and meet for that purpose, by proper deputation. A council has already been formed in this place furnished with all the necessary powers, and composed of us, the undersigned. If in imitation of the meetings, which took place in this country in 95, the deputies of the different districts meet without the least delay, the means of our common defence will soon be organized. We will mutually instruct and assist each other, according to the means and local circumstances of each district. Let for this purpose exact returns immediately be made of all, who can take up arms, from the age of seventeen to forty-five, and somewhat more, where bodily strength and vigour permit; let also instantly a return be made of all arms, fit for service, which are found in the different districts. Let us immediately be trained to arms by military men, retired from service, who are scattered over our provinces, and let us at least devote two hours a day to military exercise. The general principles, which move us to think and act as we do, you will with pleasure find elucidated in another paper, which for that purpose shall be circulated among you. *Santander, May*

27, 1808. R. Thomas, Bishop of Santander. D. Angel Gutierrez de Celis. D. Jose de Miranda. D. Francisco de a Torre. Coun. de Campo-Giro. D. Juan de Trueba. D. Geronimo de Argos. D. Jose Maria de la Torre. D. Jose de Quijano. D. Jac. Antonio de Losada. D. Vicente de Camino. D. J. M. Fernandez Velarde. D. Joaquin Perez de Cosin. D. Francisco de la Pedraja. D. J. Nepomuceno Munoz. By command of the illustrious council, D. Luis Del Campo, Sec. *Letter from the 1st Lord of the Admiralty to the Mayor of London, 11th July, 1808.*

My lord,—I have great pleasure in acquainting your lordship, that by dispatches received at the Admiralty this morning from vice admiral lord Collingwood, dated off Cadiz, the 14th of June, it appears that the French squadron in Cadiz struck their colours to the Spaniards at seven o'clock on the morning of that day, when the Spanish colours were immediately hoisted on board them. The Spanish admiral is about to embark for England on board the *Revenge*, commanded by Sir John Gore, as one of the commissioners from the council of Seville to his majesty's government.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MADRID.

PEOPLE OF MADRID,—Seville has learned with consternation and surprise your dreadful catastrophe of the second of May; the weakness of a government, which did nothing in our favour; which ordered arms to be directed against you, and your heroic sacrifices. Blessed be ye, and your memory shall shine immortal in the annals of our nation.—She has seen with horror, that the authors of all your misfortunes, and of our's, has published a proclamation, in which he distorted every fact, and pretended, that you gave the first provocation, while it was he who provoked you. The government was weak enough to sanction and order that proclamation to be circulated, and saw, with perfect composure, numbers of you put to death, for a pretended violation of laws which did not exist. The French were told in that proclamation, that French blood profusely shed, was crying out for vengeance! And the Spanish blood does not it cry out for vengeance?—that Spanish blood, shed by an army which hesitated not to attack a disarmed and defenceless people, living under their laws and their king, and against whom cruelties were committed which shake the human frame with horror. We, all Spain, exclaim—the Spanish blood shed in Madrid cries aloud for revenge!—Comfort yourselves, we are your brethren: we will fight like you, until we perish in defending our king and country. Assist us with your good wishes, and your continual

prayers offered up to the Most High, whom we adore, and who cannot forsake us because he never forsakes a just cause. Should any favourable opportunity offer, exert yourselves as valiant Spaniards, to shake off the ignominious yoke imposed on you with the slaughter of so many of your innocent fellow citizens, and with a perfidy horrid beyond example.—Don Juan Bautista Esteller, first secretary—Don Juan Pardo, second secretary.—*Seville, the 20th May 1808.*

BANDO.

The supreme junta of government, desirous beyond measure that the public should partake of the joy which they feel, informs it,—1. That the city of Valentia, and the kingdom fired with the generous impulse of their loyalty, have proclaimed and sworn allegiance to their king Don Ferdinand VII. without any trouble or disorder whatever ensuing.—2. That in consequence thereof they named a government, to superintend the kingdom as long as the urgency of their circumstances should continue.—3. That they published a declaration to that purpose including other matters, which shall be communicated in due time.—4. That they recognise a sovereignty, and will neither receive nor obey any orders but those of Ferdinand VII. and in the interim the government he names, or that which represents him.—5. That the paper stamped in the name of the lieutenant general of the kingdom shall not be used.—6. That his excellency the count de Cervellon is named general of the troops.—7. That the aforesaid government should enforce a general enlistment of inhabitants, from the age of 16 to 40.—8. That they have stopped a number of chests of money, which were destined for Madrid.—And for the information and for an example which we hope will be followed by all Spain, the present paper is ordered to be published.—Royal palace of the Alcazar, May 31, 1808.—Don Juan Bautista Pardo, Sec. 2.—Don Manuel de Aguilar, Sec. 3.

CORDOVA—TO ITS INHABITANTS.

Soldiers!—The kingdoms of Andalusia see themselves attacked by the assassins of the north; your country is on the point of being oppressed by the yoke of a tyrant; you yourselves will be dragged from your firesides and from your homes. The wanton Murat is fabricating 40,000 manacles to conduct you, like the most contemptible animals, to the north. What atrocity! Who is such a coward, such an infidel, that his breast does not burn with courage, at the cries of his country lamenting over its destruction?—Soldiers! Do you, too, groan over it; but let your groans be the groans of rage and fury at the wretch who plunges her

in slavery and oppression. Would you rather die defending the robberies and impieties of a perfidious traitor, than shedding your blood in defence of your church, your nation, and yourselves?—Soldiers! ye that have been the first in raising the standard of the nation, carry into your camps, virtue, religion, and the manners of your forefathers. With such qualities they overcame innumerable armies. If among the chiefs who lead you to the theatre of glory and honour, you should perceive any treachery, abandon them, and choose others more worthy of your cause.—Soldiers! Twelve millions of inhabitants are observing you and envying your glory; nay, even France herself pants for your triumphs and success.

INSTRUCTION.

From the Supreme Junta of the Government, to all Cities and Towns, to be executed with the utmost promptitude.

1. In cities and towns consisting of 2000 or more house-holders, a junta shall be established, which shall superintend all arrangements, and shall be obeyed by all the inhabitants; and in places of smaller size, the ayuntamientos shall hold the place and perform the functions of the juntas.—2. It is ordered, that with the concurrence of the ayuntamiento, clergy, prelates, priests, nobles and other persons so assembled, a junta of six be formed to receive orders from the supreme junta, and correspond therewith, and in every particular act under their authority; and the inhabitants and the corregida are required to obey them in their office, and every thing thereunto appertaining.—3. It shall be the duty of this junta to enlist the inhabitants from the age of 16 to 45, first, such as volunteer their services, and then all the secular inhabitants of the aforesaid age; to form them in companies, to assign them respectable persons for captains, lieutenants, and ensigns, with full power to name serjeants and corporals, which they will proceed to do with all possible dispatch.—4. They will instruct the towns of their districts, and even those of the neighbouring districts, to submit to the same regulations, enlistments, and appointments, and to advise the junta thereof without delay.—5. For the present, each company shall remain in its district, but the junta is empowered, if it think fit, to call together the enlisted companies in the other towns.—6. The junta will name a confidential person to administer, under its direction, the funds which must meet the expences of the present occasion.—7. These funds shall be raised

by orders of the junta to all corporations and rich individuals, and over and above a subscription shall be opened, that all the inhabitants may contribute in proportion to their zeal for their king and country, and the urgent necessity of the cause.—8. To these funds shall be added patriotic loans of money, to be afterward repaid in full; and it is expected from the public spirit of the inhabitants, that there will be no occasion for forced loans, or any other proceeding, which, though it might be violent, would still be justifiable by the necessity of the case.—9. This proclamation (bando) shall be printed and published by this supreme junta, and shall be placarded and circulated in all places.—10. All the magistrates and public functionaries are for the present confirmed in their respective offices.—*Seville, 29th May, 1808.*—D. JUAN BAUTISTA ESTELLER, Sec. 1^o. D. J. B. PARDO, Sec. 2^o.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL.

PORTUGUESE,—Your lot is, perhaps, the hardest ever endured by any people on the earth. Your princes were compelled to fly from you, and the events in Spain have furnished an irrefragable proof of the absolute necessity of that measure.—You were ordered not to defend yourselves, and you did not defend yourselves. Junot offered to make you happy, and your happiness has consisted in being treated with greater cruelty than the most ferocious conquerors inflict on the people whom they have subdued by force of arms, and after the most obstinate resistance. You have been despoiled of your princes, your laws, your usages, your customs, your property, your liberty, even your lives, and your holy religion, which your enemies never have respected, however they may, according to their custom, have promised to protect it, and however they may affect and pretend to have any sense of it themselves. Your nobility has been annihilated, its property confiscated in punishment of its fidelity and loyalty. You have been basely dragged to foreign countries, and compelled to prostrate yourselves at the feet of the man who is the author of all your calamities, and who, by the most horrible perfidy, has usurped your government, and rules you with the sceptre of iron. Even now your troops have left your borders, and are travelling in chains to die in the defence of him who has oppressed you, by which means his deep malignity may accomplish his purpose, by destroying those who should constitute your strength, and by rendering their lives subservient to his

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triumphs, and to the savage glory to which he aspires.—Spain beheld your slavery, and the horrible evils which followed it, with mingled sensations of grief and despair. You are her brother, and she panted to fly to your assistance. But certain chiefs, and a government either weak or corrupt, kept her in chains, and were preparing the means by which the ruin of our king, our laws, our independence, our liberty, our lives, and even the holy religion in which we are united, might accompany yours, by which a barbarous people might consummate their own triumph, and accomplish the slavery of every nation in Europe—our loyalty, our honour, our justice, could not submit to such flagrant atrocity! We have broken our chains—let us then to action. We have armies, we have chiefs, and the universal cry of Spain is, “We will die in defence of our country, but we will take care that these infamous enemies shall die with us.”—Come then, ye generous Portuguese! unite with Spain to die in defence of your country. Her banners expect you; they will receive you as brethren infamously oppressed.—The cause of Spain and of Portugal is the same: distrust not our troops—their wishes are the same as your own, and you may reckon upon their courage and their strength as a part of your security.—You have among yourselves the object of your vengeance—obey not the authors of your misfortune—attack them—they are but a handful of miserable panic-struck men, humiliated and conquered already by the perfidy and cruelties which they have committed, and which have covered them with disgrace in the eyes of Europe and the world! Rise then in a body, but avoid staining your honourable hands with crimes, for your design is to resist them and to destroy them—our united efforts will do for this perfidious nation; and Portugal, Spain, nay all Europe, shall breathe or die free like men.—Portuguese,—Your country is not in danger—it is already gone—unite, unite, and fly to restore and to save it.—*Seville, May 30, 1808.*—By direction of the supreme Junta of government,
—DON JUAN BAUTISTA ESTELLER, Sec. 1^o.
DON JUAN BAUTISTA PARDO, Sec. 2^o.

DECLARATION OF WAR

Against the Emperor of France, Napoleon the First.

France, under the government of the emperor Napoleon the first, has violated towards Spain the most sacred compacts—has arrested her monarchs—obliged them to a forced and manifestly void abdication and

renunciation; has behaved with the same violence towards the Spanish nobles whom he keeps in his power—has declared that he will elect a king of Spain, the most horrible attempt that is recorded in history—has sent his troops into Spain, seized her fortresses and her capital, and scattered his troops throughout the country—has committed against Spain all sorts of assassinations, robberies, and unheard of cruelties; and this he has done with the most enormous ingratitude to the services which the Spanish nation has rendered France, to the friendship it has shown her, thus treating it with the most dreadful perfidy, fraud and treachery, such as was never committed against any nation, or monarch, by the most barbarous or ambitious king or people. He has in fine declared, that he will trample down our monarchy, our fundamental laws, and bring about the ruin of our holy catholic religion.—The only remedy therefore for such grievous ills, which are so manifest to all Europe, is in war, which we declare against him.—In the name therefore of our king Ferdinand the seventh, and of all the Spanish nation, we declare war by land and sea against the emperor Napoleon the first, and against France; we are determined to throw off her domination and tyranny, and command all Spaniards to act hostilely against her, to do her all possible damage according to the laws of war, to place an embargo upon all French ships in our ports, and all property, and effects, in whatever part of Spain they may be, whether belonging to the government or to the individuals of that nation. In the same manner we command, that no embarrassment, nor molestation be done to the English nation, nor its government, nor its ships, property, or effects, nor any individual of that nation.—We declare that there shall be open and free communication with England, that we have contracted, and will keep an armistice with her, and that we hope to conclude a durable and lasting peace.—Moreover we protest, we will not lay down our arms till the emperor Napoleon the first, has restored to Spain our king Ferdinand the seventh, and the rest of the royal family; has respected the sacred rights of the nation, which he has violated, and her liberty, integrity, and independence.—With the same understanding and accordance with the Spanish nation, we command that the present solemn declaration be printed, posted and circulated, among all the people and provinces of Spain and America, that it may be known in Europe, Africa and Asia.—Given in the royal palace of Alcazar at Seville, this 6th of June, 1808.—By order

of the Supreme Junta of Government.—
MANUEL MARIA AGUILAR, Sec. JUAN
BAUTISTA PARDO, Sec.

CONNECTION WITH ENGLAND.

*Don ALVARO FLOREZ ESTRADA, Procurator
General of the Principality of Asturias,
made the following Proposition to the
Supreme Council.*

The general council of the principality of Asturias do not delay a moment in making known to the public the daily proofs they receive of the friendship of the English government and nation, who in order the better to enable it to supply all our wants, have promptly sent to this capital a military committee, composed of three officers of distinction, who, this morning, presented themselves before the supreme council, not only to assure us, that all the supplies and succour which we pointed out to them, might be daily expected in our ports, but also to offer in the name of their government, to this principality, and to the rest of the Spanish nation, all other assistance we might stand in need of; to send us troops, money, arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores, and to make a common cause with us, in order that we might be able to repel and destroy the common enemy. That generous nation deserves the utmost gratitude on our part; but as it offers its protection to all the provinces which defend the good cause, it will know on the other hand, how to employ all its power against those provinces, which, guided by a pernicious selfishness or apparent timidity, are forgetful of their duty, in the present critical circumstances in which the country is placed, do not endeavour in imitation of the real patriots, to defend the glorious cause, and shake off a disgraceful yoke. The supreme council think it right to declare to the public, that they felt the liveliest emotions of gratitude and respect, when they heard the commissioners give them the assurance, that it was their anxious wish to shed the last drop of their blood fighting with our brethren, in defence of the common cause.—ALVARO FLOREZ ESTRADA.—Oviedo, the 30th June, 1808.

And it having been resolved, that the preceding proposition be printed and circulated through all the districts of the principality, we communicated it also to you for your information. God keep you many years in his holy guard.—IGNACIO FLOREZ VALDEE. JUAN ARGUELLES TERAL, Representative and Secretary.—Oviedo, the 30th June, 1808.

FRENCH FLEET AT CADIZ.

*A Dispatch, together with inclosures, from
Major-General Spencer, Cadiz, June 12.*

My Lord,—The French squadron, consisting of five sail of the line and a frigate, having placed themselves in a defensive position, in the channel leading to the Caraccas, and out of the reach of the works of Cadiz, and having refused to listen to any terms, I have great satisfaction in reporting that the Spanish gun and mortar boats, and the batteries erected for this purpose, on the Isle of Leon, and near Fort Louis, commenced hostilities against the French ships, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, and the firing continued without interruption on both sides till night. It was renewed on the part of the Spaniards on the morning of the 10th, and partially continued till two, when a flag of truce was hoisted by the French, but the terms proposed being inadmissible, the Spaniards intend to recommence hostilities with an additional battery, to the eastward of Fort Louis, consisting of thirty 24-pounders.—Admiral Purvis and myself wished to have co-operated in this attack, but the Spaniards, feeling themselves confident in their own force, have declined our offers of assistance.—The Supreme Council of Seville have nominated commissioners, and applied last night for passports, and a frigate to convey them to England, and they are also equally anxious to send feluccas with dispatches to South America.—Information having been received that a small French corps was assembling at Tavira, with a view of entering Spain by the River Guadiana, we have been requested to proceed against this corps, and either to attack them on the coast, or endeavour to prevent the further prosecution of their plans against Spain. I accordingly propose to sail immediately for this object, Lord Collingwood approving of it.—Admiral Purvis had already detached three ships of war off the mouth of the Guadiana, and has offered every other necessary assistance, which Lord Collingwood has since confirmed.

Letter from General Morla, Captain-General of Andalusia and Governor of Cadiz, addressed to their Excellencies Adm. Purvis and Major-General Spencer.

Admiral Rossilly, as your Excellencies will observe by the annexed copy, has proposed to disarm, but upon conditions which I thought were inadmissible. Whatever may be his terms of surrender, I shall in no manner deviate from my promise; it is therefore necessary that I should have your consent, as I have already said in my first conference with Brigadier-General Smith and Captain Sir John Gore, to whom I have pledged myself with simplicity and good faith.—It will afford me considerable satisfaction to consult with your Excellencies on

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all occurrences, incidents, and circumstances, conducive to our common advantage, and contrary to the interests of the common enemy.—Nothing gives me more real pleasure than the absolute confidence of your Excellencies in my candour and sincerity, with which I remain your Excellencies' most affectionate and devoted servant,—(Signed) THOMAS MORLA.—*Cadiz, June 11, 1808.*
Letter from Admiral Rossilly, addressed to Gen. Morla, dated on board the Admiral's ship, Hero Bay, off Cadiz, June 11, 1808.

Captain-General,—Obliged to defend myself on account of the inquietude inspired into the people of this province by my imposing attitude, I yesterday, in order to tranquillize them, proposed to your Excellency to quit the Bay. In case the English cannot accede to this proposal, I suggest the idea of disembarking my means of attack, and keeping my ships' companies on board; no colours shall be displayed on my squadron. Hostages shall be given for our security, our sick, and all the French people in the province, with their national and individual property. Hostages will be equally given on my part. The refreshments, water, and provisions necessary for my squadron, shall be provided on my paying for them, as has hitherto been done. In short, I shall demand no conditions but those which are necessary for my honour and that of the people serving under my orders, and as are compatible with the public tranquillity. Deprived by my proposal of the means of defence against the exterior enemy, I demand security against them.

Answer from General Morla to Admiral Rossilly.

Excellent Sir, Admiral Rossilly,—In answer to certain proposals and official demands transmitted by your Excellency, which, although dictated by your honour, are unquestionably incompatible with mine, as must be evident to your Excellency, I have to acquaint you, that I cannot accept any terms but an unconditional surrender, my honour and character not allowing me to depart in any way from my promises. I therefore inform you, that my orders from the Supreme Council being positive with respect to the surrender of the squadron commanded by your Excellency, I cannot enter into any conditions without previously consulting them. It is likewise my duty to consult with the English commanders, as without their consent, I cannot compromise myself.—For these reasons, I shall suspend my attack, until I have dispatched those two expresses; availing myself however of the intermediate time to prepare other means

for the attack.—Nothing opposes the individual esteem entertained for your Excellency, by your faithful servant,—(Signed)—THOMAS MORLA.—*Cadiz, June 11.*
(To be continued.)

DENMARK AND SWEDEN.—*Observations on the Answer published at Stockholm to the Danish Declaration of War:—from the Copenhagen Gazette.*

The king of Sweden must have little respect for his people, if he can suppose them to be so unacquainted with the events of our time, that he may be permitted to confound effects with their causes, by representing the alliance of Denmark with France as a cause of the present war, when it is to be considered, as all Europe knows, as a consequence of the treacherous attack of England. The king of Sweden thinks he can so blind the eyes of the Swedish nation, that he can make them believe that the war in which Sweden is engaged, is a defensive war, whereas, it is an offensive one, which it has cost the king of Sweden much trouble to procure, as he has done all in his power to kindle its flames.—The difference, the very great difference, between the policy of our government and that of the king of Sweden has been, that the former has with the greatest care endeavoured to secure to its people the blessings of peace; while the latter appears only to have had for his object to sacrifice the blood of his subjects, bring on the calamities of war, and to lay waste their peaceable habitations. All see with surprise the king of Sweden, whose constant restlessness, and whose false policy has extended the theatre of war so far to the north, yet represents himself as the sovereign who had offered peace and tranquillity to the Baltic and its coasts. But he has rendered his love for peace too manifest for such an offer to be confided in.—After having made every exertion, for a series of years, to become involved in a war, and having at length obtained his object and shewn that he knew how to enter into a war inconsiderately, and how to maintain it with folly and obstinacy after he had been compelled entirely to abandon the first theatre of his war, it was believed that true policy and regard for the welfare of his subjects would have induced him to live in peace and good understanding with his neighbours, and to find a refuge in the patience of a magnanimous people, against a storm which he himself had raised. His sense of danger on the one hand, and of his feebleness on the other, might probably inspire him with the wish to see the Baltic maintained free from a foreign fleet.—While in

Germany he wished to set bounds to the victories of the Emperor Napoleon, and used every endeavour to persuade different courts that this was his object, nor would he pledge himself for the tranquillity and security of the Baltic from English ships. Can we place more confidence in one of these professions than the other? Can it be required of Denmark to trust the pacific promises of England? Will they be held more sacred than those given last year, at the very moment when an attack was intended? A sovereign can have little respect for the truth, who can say to his nation, whose danger and sufferings are the only consequences of an alliance with England, "I have concluded an alliance with England to obtain the means of defence for Sweden." Was Sweden then in danger? Who threatened Sweden with an attack? Against whom was this protection and aid necessary? Every Swede of sense knows, as well as all Europe, that all his losses, and all the dangers that threaten him, are the consequence of this alliance with England which no self-defence rendered necessary. Had this alliance not existed, Sweden would still have possessed Pomerania, would still have possessed Finland, and the country would not have been a prey to famine, and all the misery which war brings with it. Were all the offers actually made to the King of Sweden, which he has signified were made, England is much indebted to him for not accepting them; but the Swedish nation is not. And if it were prudence not to accept some of these offers, it is to be regretted that they could not induce him to depart from an alliance that must certainly have the most destructive consequences to his country.—Had the King of Sweden seen the true interest of himself and his country, the North would have preserved peace, Sweden would have still possessed Pomerania and Finland, Denmark her fleet and tranquillity, and England her honour. All these losses are the consequences of the policy of the King of Sweden. How often has Sweden been warned by the Powers of Europe? Had we received such warning, our fleets would have been in safety, and ready, if necessary, to guard, in conjunction with our northern brethren, the safety of our seas from the tyrants of the ocean.

THE POPE—*Answer of his Eminence Cardinal Gabrielli, first Secretary of State, to the note of his Excellency M. Champagny. Addressed to M. le Fevre, Chargé d'Affaires from the Emperor of France, dated April 19, 1808.*

After your excellency had made known

to the holy father, that it was the decided wish of his majesty the emperor and king, that he should enter into an offensive and defensive league with the other powers of Italy, as had been declared by M. Champagny to the Cardinal Caprara, by note of the 3d current, the dispatch of the said cardinal has been received, which brought the original note of the above minister.—The holy father, after having attentively read and considered the said document, has ordered Cardinal Gabrielli, first secretary of state, to make known to your excellency his holiness's sentiments on its contents; beginning with that which forms the cardinal point among all the others. His holiness has seen with pain, that even the final proposition therein contained of the offensive and defensive league, should be accompanied with the threat of depriving him of his temporal dominions in case of his non-compliance. If worldly considerations had at all influenced the conduct of the holy father, he would, from the first, have yielded to the wish of his majesty, and not have exposed himself to suffer so many calamities: but the holy father is regulated alone by the consideration due to his duty and his conscience, both have prevented him from agreeing to the federation, and they equally hinder him from consenting to the offensive and defensive league, which differs but in name; its nature, however, does not except any prince, to whom the pope, according to the circumstances of the times, might not become an enemy.—His holiness feels, moreover, that this article, far from improving, detracts from his situation. In the articles presented to Cardinal de Bayan, the federation was proposed as alone against heretics and the English. But this is couched in general terms, pointing out no people as an enemy, yet excluding no government, no nation, from the contingency of becoming one. If, then, his holiness declined from conscientious motives to be a party to that federation, so is he equally withheld from this league. The holy father would not merely bind himself to a defence, but to an aggression. Then would be seen the minister of the God of peace placing himself in a state of perpetual warfare; then would be seen their common father in arms against his children, and the head of the church exposing himself, by his own act, to a deprivation of his spiritual connection with the catholics of those powers against which the league would make it imperative on him to act hostilely. How then can his holiness shake off his power and natural character, and sacrifice, as must be the consequence, the interest of religion?—His holiness, un-

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rages and insults; after having seen how fruitless were all the remonstrances urged against the hostile proceedings of the French; after having peaceably borne the humiliation of imprisonment; and seeing these insults, these contempts, these violations, increase with every hour, his holiness found it necessary, though with the deepest regret, to determine on the recal of his legate in order to overthrow, at least, in the face of the world, the false and scandalous opinion that whatever might occur, even the most flagrant wrongs, would receive his tacit consent.—

—In this very recal, the precise period of which could not have been anticipated by his holiness, he professed, along with those constant affectionate regards which he entertained for his majesty, that could he but consent to the demand of the evacuation of Rome, and be satisfied with those concessions which are compatible with the duties of his holiness, the legate might continue, in conformity with his instructions, to exercise his functions.—But his majesty proved inflexible, and instead of receding a single step, preferred the discontinuance of the legation, and the departure of the pontifical representative.—It is not, therefore, his holiness, who by this hypothetical recal of his legate, has declared war against the emperor; it is the emperor who chooses to declare war against his holiness; and not content with declaring it against his temporal sovereignty, he threatens to raise in his spiritual, a wall of division between the catholics of France and the sovereign pontiff, in the assurance, according to M. Champagny's note, that the cardinal legate having given up his functions, the Gallican church resumed its doctrine in all its integrity.—His holiness has too good an opinion of the illustrious clergy of France to doubt that the Gallican church, however jealous of its prerogatives, is yet so attached to the chair of St. Peter, that it will maintain itself unshaken in its true principles, without asserting rights, which it does not and cannot possess; nor become schismatic, by separating itself from the catholic unity.—It is not then—the repetition is important—it is not his holiness who seeks the rupture. A pacific prince, notwithstanding he was obliged to witness the spoliation, infiance of all right, of his states of Benevento and Ponte Corvo; notwithstanding his enormous expense of maintaining French troops; notwithstanding the usurpation of his capital, the usurpation of almost all his sovereign rights; notwithstanding the violent dismissal of so

many spiritual persons, composing his holy senate; and notwithstanding all the other acts, by which his dignity has been degraded, all that his holiness did was to command his people when the French army entered Rome, to shew it respect; all that his holiness did was to receive it in the most hospitable manner, and implore of his majesty, in the mean time, relief from so many aggravated evils; and all that his holiness now does in this extremity is, to mourn between the vestibule and the altar, invoking the pity of heaven upon his people, and that by a return to better counsels, the most potent emperor Napoleon will not suffer the inheritance of the Roman see, given by providence to the head of the catholic church in full enjoyment, to be lost and rooted out.—Thus has his holiness made war! Thus has he conducted himself to the present hour towards his majesty, however distressing and unfortunate has been the result. Still his holiness will cherish the hope that his majesty, rejecting the counsels of the enemies of the holy see, who have had recourse to every art to change his disposition, will revert to their former friendly correspondence, and be satisfied with the concessions made in the note of the 28th of January. If, by the hidden purposes of the Most High, this should not take place, and his majesty regardless of his own glory, and deaf to the calls of justice, should put his threats in execution, and take possession of the states of the church by right of conquest, overturning the government in consequence, his holiness will be unable to remedy such fatal occurrences, but he solemnly declares, that the first will not be a conquest, as his holiness is in peace with all the world, but will be an usurpation more violent than history can furnish; and the second will not be the result of conquest, but of that usurpation. He declares, at the same time, that it will not be the work of political genius and illumination, but an awful visitation of that God from whom all sovereignty is derived, and especially that given to the head of the church.—Bowing, in that event, with profound adoration to the decrees of heaven, his holiness will find consolation in reflecting that the creator and redeemer willed these things, and that all concurs to accomplish his purposes when his appointed time arrives.—This is the answer which the undersigned is commanded by his holiness to give to the note of M. Champagny, and to communicate to your excellency.—CARDINAL GABRIELLI.